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Revivaland Expansion of
Export Subsidies during 1966-70
Althoughthe June 1966 devaluation was accompanied, as we have seen, by
the elimination of the budgetary tax credits and the import entitlement schemes,
the ensuing period was characterized by a steady growth of export subsidiza-
tion, again largely of a selective and variable nature and embodying, in prac-
tice, many of the features of the schemes prior to devaluation.
We shall first trace the major developments, organizing our analysis by
type of subsidization rather than by strict chronology.Next, these diverse
subsidies will be quantified with a view to determining the degree of subsidiza-
tion they provided at different points in time, so that both their importance
and their effects on export performance can be assessed.
METHODS OF SUBSIDIZATION
Cash Subsidies.
The major change in methods of export subsidization in the post-devalua-
tion period was the large-scale introduction of cash subsidies on an explicit
basis. These were introduced in August 1966 for most engineering goods and
chemicals and were successively extended to a number of items. By the end of
1967, they embraced the bulk of engineering goods, chemicals, processed
foods, paper products, sports goods, woolen carpets, steel scrap, prime iron
and steel, and cotton textiles, yarn and "made-up" goods amounting to over
15 percent of total exports in 1964—65 and 1965—66.
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1. The subsidies were selective. They ranged from 10 to 25 percent ad
valorem.1 In contrast to the main thrust of the pre-devaluation subsidies,
therefore, the selectivity was clearly narrower, confined to a very limited num-
ber of rates. As between the different groups, the range was again narrower
than before, from 2 to 25 percent. However, the inter-group differences in
rates were not altogether negligible. Cotton piece goods had subsidies ranging
from 2 to 8.5 percent; made-up cotton goods generally carried 4.25 percent;
steel scrap had 5 percent; biscuits had 3 percent; confectionery was 17 per-
cent; and 25 percent applied to many engineering goods.
2. Furthermore, there is unmistakable evidence that the export subsidies
were adjustable upward, not merely by explicit changes in the rates in periodic
announcements, but also by special dispensation if the export order in ques-
tion was "sizable." Frankena has shown, on the basis of interviews with lead-
ing exporters of engineering goods, that the government was willing to consider
an ad hoc increase in cash subsidy when this was considered necessary to
secure (i.e., to induce an exporter to quote a low enough price on) an export
order worth $0.67 million or more, and there are several cases where addi-
tional cash subsidies of 2.5 to 5 percent of the f.o.b. value were given.
Import Replenishments.
Although the import entitlement schemes were abolished with devalua-
tion, they were soon replaced in August 1966 by import replenishment
schemes. Under the latter, exporters were again assigned import licenses of a
value which was a pre-specified percentage of the f.o.b. export value. While
the two schemes were virtually alike in their modes of operation, except for
a few differences to be noted shortly, the major difference was supposed to be
that the replenishment licenses merely replaced the supposed import content
of the export whereas the entitlement licenses were alleged to have been gen-
erally at twice this import-content value (and hence embodying an element of
"open" subsidy).
Of course, in a situation where imports carry a scarcity premium, a re-
plenishment license will also amount to a subsidy on exports. And we must
therefore take it into account in estimating total export subsidization in the
Indian economy.2 The "equivalent" ad valorem subsidy may further be ap-
proximated by multiplying the replenishment rate by the premium at which
the replenishment license can be sold.3
It is significant that, despite the intention to differentiate the replenish-
ment scheme from the earlier entitlement schemes, many features of the latter
were quickly to emerge in the former:
1. The transferability of the licenses was subjected to control, as before.
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abilityof licenses as among the numerous entitlement schemes. Identical
restrictions were to be carried over into the replenishment schemes, thereby
lowering the subsidy-worth of the scheme and also making its operation cum-
bersome without any justifying rationale.
2. Furthermore, just as the rule that the entitlements should be twice
the import-content was rarely observed in practice, and in fact was violated
in favor of larger allotments, the available evidence points to identical tenden-
cies of the replenishments to go well beyond the value of the (direct) import-
content. Thus, Frankena has found that in many cases, including machine
tools, stationary diesel engines, electric fans, sewing machines and certain
chemicals, the face value of licenses was considerably greater than the average
current import-content of the exported product.
3. The restrictions on transferability were accompanied by restrictions
on what could be imported, in common with the entitlement schemes. Again,
as with the latter, these restrictions were occasionally evaded by the authori-
ties. Further, the early entitlement scheme restrictions on eligible imports had
already been weakened over time—especially in that exporters were allowed
to import items other than those identified as the direct import-content of the
exported products, provided they were direct inputs inl:o what the exporter
produced altogether (e.g., he may have a multi-product operation) or into
items produced by the entire export promotion group (e.g., plastics) within
which the entitlements had eventually come to be transferable. The same
pattern of (restricted) eligibility was to be carried over into the replenish-
ment schemes; and no further "liberalization" was permitted in principle.
4. Aside from the fact that "banned" items were occasionally made avail-
al)le under the replenishment licenses, these licenses carried a premium in
the market (despite the import liberalization during the post-devaluation
period) in part due to the fact that they were not source-tied as against the
AU licenses which frequently made imports possible only against (higher-
cost) source-tied aid.4
The only respect in which the replenishment scheme appears to have
been different from the entitlement scheme is in the relative stability of the
rates (which, as before, were set as a percentage of f.o.b. export value). In
addition, exports to the Soviet bloc were to become eligible for replenishment
with free-foreign-exchange licenses.
Supply of Indigenous Materials at International Prices.
Although the idea of supplying domestic materials at international prices
for export purposes had been conceived and implemented in respect to the
supply of iron, steel and tinplate to the engineering industry, prior to the
devaluation, it was adopted at a significant level in May 1967 for the supply102 LIBERAÜZATION EPISODE
of iron and steel with eligibility for all manufacturers using primary iron and
steel.
These schemes eventually were to extend to winding wires, PVC resin
and aluminum as well. However, as Frankena has noted, the latter schemes
were not operated with the same efficacy as the steel scheme. Thus, the PVC
resin scheme during 1969 and 1970, under which some raw materials for
plastics and cable insulation were supplied at international prices, required
an offsetting transfer by the exporter of part of his replenishment liëenses to
the supplier of these materials—thus reducing the subsidy on that front. Für-
ther, in some cases, as with aluminum supplies to user-exporters at interna-
tional prices, this meant an effective subsidy to the users but, on the other
hand, the sale of aluminum at these concessional prices was counted as an
offset against export obligations of the aluminum producers. Furthermore,
some of the concessions were not of durable value, since they were based on
informal agreements with the government rather than legislation. For ex-
ample, in 1967 the manufacturers of winding wires agreed to give a price
concession to exporter-manufacturers of electrical equipment such as fans,
motors and transformers; in 1969 several manufacturers of winding wires
were withholding such a price concession to user-exporters.
The steel scheme did work more effectively, however, as it was based
on the principle of direct subsidization of the steel price.5 And the subsidy
element in the scheme was indeed positive (as quantified in the next section)
since the domestic steel prices exceeded the foreign prices—until the rise in
international steel prices above the Indian control prices in late 1969.
Unfortunately, however, the scheme had drawbacks similar to those of
the other subsidy schemes we have just reviewed. The subsidy was restricted
(without any economic rationale that we can find) to steel of certain kinds,
and again to steel produced by certain major producers; and there were ad-
ministrative delays.
Other Subsidies.
In addition to the three forms of subsidization reviewed above, the post-
1966 period was characterized by three other measures which amounted to
direct subsidization of the export sector: (1) drawbacks and rebates on im-
port and excise duties paid on direct inputs; (2) subsidization through the
State Trading Corporation of a growing range of exports; and (3) subsidiza-
tion of freight rates.
Furthermore, numerous indirect subsidies operated at different levels,
in a variety of guises. Thus preferences were increasingly granted to exporting
firms in respect of (1) AU and CO licenses on volume and source-tying,
(2) facilities to invest abroad, (3) licenses to expand capacity domestically
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Moreover,the government occasionally resorted to policies aimed at
"taxing" the firms which did not export, by (1) requiring penalty-carrying
export obligations prior to licensing, for example, and (2) actually penalizing
firms (by denial of AU licenses, etc.) in certain industries when they did not
export pre-specified shares of their estimated
We review all these policies, in turn.
DRAWBACKS AND REBATES
The refund of excise and import duties on direct inputs into exports pre-
dated the devaluation, as we already know from Chapl;er 3. These policies
were continued into the post-devaluation period.
STATE TRADING CORPORATION
Effective export subsidization had also occurred in regard to products
such as rice, sugar, art silk fabrics and jute goods. The State Trading Corpo-
ration (STC) sold these exports at losses which were financed by profits that
arose from imports canalized through the STC. This policy was also carried
into the post-devaluation period.
SUBSIDIZATION OF FREIGHT, MARKETING AND CREDIT
The pre-devaluation subsidies had extended to freight concessions to
exporters in the hinterland, grants to promote participation in exhibitions
abroad, and credit concessions. These policies were to continue into the post-
devaluation period. Thus, in the engineering goods sector, transportation to
a port more than 200 miles distant normally entitled the exporter to rail freight
concessions up to 50 percent.
The marketing promotional subsidies extended not merely to participa-
tion in foreign exhibitions and overseas expenses, but also to visits of foreign
delegations to India. There were also income tax concessions for all export
marketing expenditures. In addition, the government continued to expand
credit facilities to exporters. Thus, during 1967, the Reserve Bank of India
began to charge a concessional rate of 4.5percentto commercial banks for
refinancing facilities relating to the pre-shipment and post-shipment advances
made by banks to exporters. During 1969, export credits up to 10 years at
6 percent by exporters were subsidized provided certain conditions were
filled relating to low import-content and repayment in hard currency. Even
these conditions were occasionally waived.
PREFERENTIAL SUPPLY OF RATIONED INPUTS
Since scarcity cannot always be meaningfully translated into dearness,
it is useful to mention here government allotments of rationed materials to
exporters on a preferential basis. In addition to the scheme for supplying104 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
indigenous steel at concessional, international prices, the supply of scarce
and rationed iron and steel to exporters was accorded high priority in prin-
ciple. This was also the case with aluminum, cycle tires and materials for tires
and plastics. However, no quantitatively spelled-out policy in this regard can
be discerned in the policy announcements during the post-devaluation period.
PREFERENTIAL LICENSING TO EXPAND CAPACITY
AND TO UTILIZE EXISTING CAPACITY
Preferential allocation of AU and CG licenses to firms that export was
also to become an explicit and an important part of government export-
promotion policy in the post-devaluation period. Thus, in 1968, engineering
firms exporting more than 10 percent of their production were made eligible
for such treatment by an announcement from the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
and later in 1968 the Ministry announced that licenses of the value of $2.7
million had already been issued to 46 export-oriented industrial firms.7 More-
over, in 1969, the government allowed firms exporting more than 10 percent
of their output to import (under their AU allocations) from preferred sources.
During 1970—71 firms which exported 25percentof output in 1969 were
given all AU licenses for import against free foreign exchange (source-untied),
firms which exported 10 to 25percentwere given two-thirds of their AU
licenses to import with untied funds and firms which exported less than 10
percent were given only half their AU licenses to import with untied funds.
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN COLLABORATION
Among the important preferential treatments promised to exporting
firms was the possibility of a more lenient attitude toward them when foreign
collaboration was sought. The leniency was sought in the direction, not merely
of expediting decisions, but also in the sense of permitting collaboration
in "non-priority" industries and even in industries such as "trade" where
collaboration was traditionally banned. In fact, in several such cases the
government actually went so far as to make a formal export obligation a
pre-condition for approving a foreign collaboration or investment, as with
IBM and Coca-Cola prior to devaluation.
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
BY EXPORTERS
The government also gave preference to exporters for investing abroad.
This privilege was of value to firms (1) whose domestic investment outlets
were being restricted—the case with the Large Industrial Houses under the
revised industrial licensing policy aimed at stricter, effective control of their
expansion; (2) who found foreign investments more profitable than domestic
investments; and (3) who were seeking effective ways to export capital ille-
gally, a process somewhat facilitated if the firm had foreign equity investments.
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This preference took basically the form of permitting firms to purchase
equity in a foreign enterprise when this resulted in the sale of machinery
exports by the firm to this foreign enterprise. It was thus of value mainly
to exporters of machinery and hence more restricted in scope than the other
policies we have been reviewing. However, on occasion it could extend to
firms not themselves exporting machinery (e.g., Oberoi Hotels) or to more
complex deals.
PENALTIES FOR NON-EXPORTING FIRMS
As we have noted, government policy embraced contractual export ob-
ligations prior to permission to construct or expand capacity, with or without
foreign collaboration, and in "priority" and "non-priority" industries. In
addition, the government also resorted to an explicit poiicy of pressing pro-
ducers in several of the (59) priority industries (to which import liberaliza-
tion since June 1966 had been extended) to export at least 5 percent of total
production or to face de factopenaltiesin the form of reduced AU allocations,
restrictive source-tying of import licenses and refusal to expand output. This
policy pre-dated the devaluation on an informal ad hoc basis; but it was
formalized in 1968 and 1969.8
Clearly, therefore, the post-devaluation period was to witness an active
resumption and expansion of export subsidization programs.9 We now pro-
ceed to quantify their magnitude.
QUANTIFICATION OF SUBSIDIZATION
T:ie analysis in the preceding section has already indicated the complex nature
of export subsidization even subsequent to the devaluation of June 1966. Un-
fortunately, this complexity is so considerable, especially in view of the num-
ber of rates of cash subsidy and replenishment licenses and the vastly greater
number of premia on import replenishment licenses, that we must warn the
reader that the (partial) quantification of the export incentives which we now
attempt must be regarded as indicative only of broad orders of magnitude and
as enabling us to assess broadly the trends in export performance since the de-
valuation.1° One should properly regard the great difficulty of developing
reliable measures of effective subsidy rates in an economic regime of the type
India possesses, and the consequent inability of the government to undertake
any systematic analysis of export policy and results, as an important and par-
ticularly unfortunate consequence of such regimes.
Cash Assistance.
Broad orders of magnitude concerning subsidies in the form of cash as-
sistance may be provided for engineering goods, chemicals and other groups.106 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
Frankena's detailed study of the engineering industry in India gives (among
other things) the major cash subsidy rates for 1969—70 for 80 percent of the
engineering exports in 1969. By weighting the subsidy rates by the relative
share in exports, we estimate the average cash subsidy rate for engineering
goods (plus iron and steel) as 12.4 percent during 1969—70 and as 17.6 per-
cent for engineering goods (excluding iron and steel) •11
Wehave also put together the cash subsidy rates for the entire post-de-
valuation period by the detailed classification by-product that is actually used to
operate the scheme and which distinguishes among nearly 300 product-types.
Unfortunately, while we did have these subsidy rates, we could not obtain a
comparable classification for exports and therefore the export-share-weighted
average cash subsidy rates which we wished to calculate (by even a rough-
and-ready regrouping of exports by the subsidy-classification) could not be
computed despite our attempts at securing the necessary information.
Domestic Materials at International Prices.
The principal scheme for providing exporters with inputs at international
prices related to the supply of steel to the engineering industry. Quantifying
this incentive as an ad valorem equivalent subsidy on exports of engineering
goods required that we obtain the international London Metal Exchange
(LME) prices for different types of steel, the corresponding domestic Joint
Plant Committee (JPC) prices, multiply the difference (when LME < JPC
prices) by the correspondingcoefficients for the relevant steel inputs into
engineering goods and then divide by the unit f.o.b. value of engineering goods
exports.
The average (unweighted) subsidy implied by the difference between
international and domestic prices of various categories of steel appears to have
varied from zero during January—March 1970 to a high of 25 percent during
October 1968—March 1969.12 The cost of steel input as a proportion of total
cost of production of engineering goods is estimated to be about 15 percent.13
Thus, at its maximum value of 25 percent, the subsidy on steel input to the
engineering sector amounted to about 4 percent of the domestic cost of pro-
duction. If we assume that the f.o.b. price of exports of engineering goods was
around 50 percent of the domestic cost—and this may not be too far out, as
Frankena's estimated range is 50—75 percent—the steel input subsidy would
then be of the order of 8 percent of f.o.b. prices.
This number compares reasonably well with Frankena's estimate of 14
percent subsidy for steel pipes, tubes, and fittings and 8 percent for transmis-
sion line towers and other fabricated steel structures for mid-1969.14 More-
over, recent studies of selected exporting firms in 1968—69 indicate that, for
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Such schemes for providing materials at international prices apparently
tended to increase during this period, and were of some importance for chemi-
cals and plastics. Thus, in the plastics industry, raw materials such as low and
high density polyethylene, PVC and polysterene were made available at inter-
national prices which were as much as 75percentbelow the domestic price in
some instances.16
Duty Drawbacks and Tax Rebates.
The import duty and indirect tax drawbacks and rebates had a vastly
differential incidence among different products. Thus the different indirect tax
rebates that were estimated for 1969 by Frankena in the engineering industry
ranged from 2 percent of f.o.b. value to 49 percent. A more comprehensive
sample survey during 1969—70, which noted the importance of such drawbacks
and rebates for exporters of lamps and tubes, cables and wires, radio and auto
accessories, tires and tubes and small tools, found this incentive to range from
2 to 60 percent during this period.'7
We have found it impossible to arrive at a meaningful average figure for
the export-subsidy equivalent of these benefits by different groups. We may
note, however, that the export-share-weighted average rate for the engineering
goods studied by Frankena for 1969 turns out to have been between 17.5 and
18 percent.'8 Thus, despite the continuing administrative difficulties attendant
on getting this benefit, it would appear that it did provide a fairly sizable export
incentive during the post-devaluation period.
State Trading Corporation Losses.
In terms of its announced policies, the STC was prepared during the post-
devaluation period to absorb losses on exports of rice, sugar, copra extractions,
coffee, fruit and vegetables, processed foods, art silk fabrics, jute goods, cement,
plywood, figures and wired glass, sports goods and human hair. During
1969—70 to 197 1—72, the major losses were absorbed in art silk fabrics and in
jute goods. The export-share-weighted average subsidy on all STC exports
assisted in this way, calculated as the ratio of losses to export value, was 14
percent in 1969—70 and 20 percent in 1970—7The subsidy rates, so calcu-
lated, on the two major items, art silk fabrics and jute goods, turn out to have
been 23.5 percent and 10.5 percent, respectively, as an average for 1969—70
and 1970—71.
Overall Assessment.
Unfortunately it is nearly impossible to indicate even, the orders of magni-
tude of the benefits implied by the other export incentives which we listed in108 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
the preceding section. Unpublished sample surveys and interviews during 1968
to 1970 strongly suggest that some of these other incentives may well have
implied, for specific firms, incentives in the order of 10 to 20 percent on an
ad valorem basis, particularly in the engineering industry.20
Thus, for example, the grant of "preferred-source" AU import licenses to
exporting firms was important in machine tools, diesel engines, small tools,
abrasives, tires and tubes, batteries and accessories and transformers, among
other products, in 1969—70. The preference for expansion of capacities was
claimed to be of importance by the interviewed firms in batteries, tires and
tubes and electric lamps, where there was fuller capacity utilization. The occa-
sional ability to procure banned and restricted items under AU imports against
export performance also improved profitability in some instances.
The vast complexity of the total "package" of export assistance thus
precludes any citing of a reliable number as the "effective" equivalent ad
valorem export subsidy rate during the different years since the devaluation.
It is clear, however, that in engineering goods in particular and to a large ex-
TABLE 7—i
Approximate Range of Average Subsidy of Selected Exports
since the 1966 Devaluation
Range of Effective,
Equivalent Export
Scheme Subsidy (% of f.o.b.)
1.Cash subsidies 15—20
2.Import replenishment licenses 15—30
3.Domestic materials at international pricesa 5—15
4.Drawbacks and rebates 10—20
5.Preferential licensing 10—20
6.Total rangeb (i) 50—90
(ii) 55—105
NOTE: These average rates apply mainly to the groups: engineering goods, chemicals
and plastics, as mentioned in the text. They conceal considerable variation among
individual products. Also note that there are products which are known to have had
subsidies outside of the figures we have put down, so that we are indicating only what
appear to us, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, to be the average orders of magnitude
in subsidization on each account since 1966; and further, that in many of the categories
the subsidization moved upwards toward the upper end of the range with the lapse of
time.
a. Recall that these are important only for steel and some plastic inputs.
b.(i) excludes row (3) and (ii) includes it. STC losses are excluded from these
totals but should be added for art silk fabrics: they amount to 10 to 20 percent of f.o.b.
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tent in chemicals, plastics and other "new" industries (i.e., sports goods, paper
products and processed foods, in the main), the export incentives since de-
va]uation must have averaged around 50 to 90 percent on an effective, ad
valorem basis (Table 7—1).
NOTES
1. See S. N. Krishnan, Export incentives and the Exchange Rates (New Delhi:
USAID, 1967), for detailed statements of the subsidy rates in the two major groups,
engineering and chemicals.
2. The notion that this is not a subsidy, however, seems to be prevalent in certain
bureaucratic circles. It is partly an erroneous result of the notion, which has some eco-
nomic rationale, that exports must be exempted from import duties on inputs.
3. There are qualifications to this method. However, as an approximation, it seems
to be the best that can be managed empirically.
4. An additional advantage claimed by importers was that bureaucratic delays were
less of a problem than they were with AU licenses. Further, multi-product firms could
always use their replenishment licenses to import inputs for "non-priority" production
within the firm, even when AU licenses for such purposes were restricted.
5. However, see qualifications below.
6. For some evidence, see Frankena, "Export," pp. 344—346.
7. ibid., p. 190.
8. Frankena states that "according to press reports, maintenance import licenses
we:e cut 5 percent in 1969—70 for 250 firms in engineering and non-engineering industries
and were to be reduced by 20 percent in 1970—71." ibid., p. 194.
9. We have not been able to secure any systematic and reliable evidence on whether
the government sought to effectively subsidize exports by buying preferentially from
exporting firms or whether public sector enterprises were de facto subsidized in order to
promote foreign sale of their production. We should also mention that barter-deal trade
which permitted exports at rather better prices than if they had been undertaken in freer
markets and correspondingly involved similarly higher import prices in turn, could also
be regarded as a form of export-subsidization.
10. In our statistical analysis of export performance in Chapter 9, therefore, we do
not use these calculated subsidy rates as inputs into our regressions although it would
have been useful to take the subsidy:inclusive export prices as an explanatory variable.
Instead of using these rates, we have tried to estimate the impact of the liberalization
package through dummy-variable analysis and to assess the results of this analysis in light
of the necessarily very rough and broad orders of export subsidization developed in this
section.
11. Note that where we did not have detailed breakdowns of exports by relevant
subcategories we have used simple average cash subsidy rates and multiplied them by the
overall export figure for a category, as with iron and steel. See Frankena, "Export,"
Table 111—7.
12. The details on the domestic and international prices of some major types of steel
during this period were acquired by us from the Ministry of Steel and the Engineering
Export Promotion Council, Bombay.
13. This figure is obtained from the inter-industry flow table for the year 1964—65
prepared by M. R. Saluja of the Indian Statistical Institute, by dividing the cost of steel110 LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
input (at 1960—61 producer's prices) by the value of output (at 1960—61 producer's
prices) of electrical equipment, non-electrical equipment, transport equipment and metal
products. It is clear that the composition of production will not necessarily correspond to
the composition of exports; however, to add this extra sophistication to our exercise
would involve tremendous work and still a lot of guesswork.
14. Frankena, "Export," Table 111—7. His overall estimate is 3 percent, p. 344.
15. This information is based on unpublished studies conducted by the Administra-
tive Staff College of India, Hyderabad.
16. Thus, in 1968, the international price of low-density polyethylene was Rs. 1,900
per metric ton whereas the domestic price was Rs. 7,480; for polysterene, these prices
were Rs. 1,800 and Rs. 6,460, respectively; and for PVC, they were Rs. 1,675 and Rs.
3,944, respectively. The full list of materials available in 1971 at international prices
included low-density and high-density polyethylene, PVC resin, polysterene, phenol and
urea formaldehyde molding powder and PVC.
17. Administrative Staff College at Hyderabad Sample Survey: results communi-
cated to us in official interviews.
18. In this case, it makes little difference whether one includes or excludes iron and
steel.
19. These calculations leave out the items which did not attract losses in the relevant
year.
20. Frankena, "Export," p. 191. The author calculates a figure of 25 percent on one
license. This underlines the fact that the figures in Table 7—1 represent, as we clearly
emphasize, only broad and necessarily rough orders of magnitude.